Key Takeaways
- Error theory is a philosophical concept that challenges the existence of universal moral truths.
- Conservatives typically disagree with error theory, and they emphasize the importance of moral realism, moral intuition, and moral values.
- Conservatives argue that error theory leads to moral nihilism and ignores moral progress.
Introduction

Error theory is a philosophical concept that challenges the objective truth of morality. It asserts that when individuals make moral claims they are in error because morality, as commonly understood, does not correspond to any objective, universal facts. Error theory posits that moral language and beliefs are deeply flawed, as they presuppose the existence of objective moral values and duties that do not exist.
The origins of error theory can be traced back to philosophers like J.L. Mackie, who argued that moral language is inherently problematic because it falsely presupposes the existence of objective moral facts. Error theorists contend that moral statements are expressions of subjective preferences or emotions rather than statements about objective moral truths. In essence, they assert that moral judgments are akin to stating personal likes or dislikes rather than making factual claims.[1]
Conservative perspective
Conservatives disagree with error theory for three main reasons. First, conservatives argue that it leads to moral nihilism. Second, conservatives are moral realists and argue for the existence of moral intuition. Third, error theory ignores moral progress and traditional values.
Moral nihilism and motivational aspect
Conservatives argue that if people were to accept error theory, it could lead to moral nihilism, a belief that there are no moral standards or values. That is, nothing is really right or wrong. This, conservatives contend, has detrimental effects on society, as moral values serve as a foundation for ethical behavior and social cohesion.
Moreover, conservatives add that Error theory fails to account for the motivational aspect of morality. The claim is made that moral judgments not only describe what is morally right or wrong but also provide motivation to act accordingly by conservatives. That is, if error theory were true, it would be difficult to explain why individuals are motivated to act morally.[2]
Moral realism and moral intuition
Conservatives uphold moral realism, which is the view that moral facts do exist and that there are objective, mind-independent moral truths. From this perspective, conservatives argue that error theory’s denial of moral facts is unfounded, contending that moral facts are just as real and objective as other types of facts, such as scientific or mathematical facts.
To challenge error theory, conservatives frequently point to moral intuition, arguing that our moral intuitions, which include our sense of right and wrong, are powerful evidence for the existence of moral facts. Conservatives believe that these intuitions reflect a deeper moral reality, even if we cannot fully explain or understand it.[3]
Tradition and moral progress
Conservatives often emphasize the importance of moral tradition and authority. That is, centuries of moral philosophy, religious teachings, and cultural practices have provided a rich framework for understanding and evaluating moral claims. Conservatives state that from this perspective, error theory’s rejection of this long-standing moral tradition is misguided.
Finally, conservatives argue that error theory is incompatible with the idea of moral progress. That is to say that if there are no moral facts or truths, then there can be no basis for moral improvement or development over time. In contrast, conservatives believe that moral progress is possible as our understanding of moral facts and principles deepens.
- [1] Streumer, Bart. 2017. Reason to Believe the Error Theory. Oxford University Press EBooks. doi:https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198785897.003.0010.
- [2] Kalf, Wouter Floris. 2019. “The Belief Problem for Moral Error Theory.” Inquiry, May, 1–22. doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2019.1612779.
- [3] Daly, Chris, and David Liggins. 2010. “In Defence of Error Theory.” Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition 149 (2): 209–30. https://www.jstor.org/stable/40606352.